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I. INTRODUCTION
For better or for worse, bankruptcy law generally recognizes
secured creditors' state law rights in collateral. The decision to
honor secured creditors' state law interests and the need to modify
those interests in bankruptcy generate an essential tension of
bankruptcy law. Much of the Bankruptcy Act's complexity and
several of its most controversial provisions arise from congressional
efforts to resolve this tension.
In trying to walk the fine line between taming and preserving
secured creditors' rights, Congress created one of the most ex-
traordinary provisions in the history of bankruptcy law. Section
1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 19781 suspends two fundamental
rules of debtor-creditor law. This provision allows an undersecured
claim to be treated as a fully secured claim2 and deems nonre-
course debt to be recourse debt.'
Congress enacted section 1111(b) in response to a bankruptcy
court decision perceived as overly favorable to debtors and thus
unfavorable to secured creditors. In that decision, In re Pine Gate
Associates,4 the court allowed a reorganizing debtor to pay under-
secured nonrecourse creditors the appraised value of collateral, to
retain the collateral for use in reorganization, and to sever the se-
cured parties' interests in the collateral. Under Pine Gate, there-
fore, the undersecured creditors would not receive full payment
1. All citations in this Article to the Bankruptcy Act, which is codified as Title 11 of
the United States Code, refer to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1513 (1982), as amended by the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1982).
3. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(A).
4. 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1478 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976). Other cases in the Pine Gate
line include: In re KRO Assocs., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 462 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re
Hobson Pike Assocs., Ltd., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1205 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1977); In re
Marietta Cobb Apartments Co., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re
Triangle Inn Assocs., 3 BANK. CT. DEC. (CRR) 716 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1977); In re Hartsdale
Assocs., 3 BANK&. CT. DEC. (CRR) 460 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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and would have no continuing interest in the asset. In a nonbank-
ruptcy setting, by contrast, the undersecured creditors could be en-
titled to the collateral itself unless they were paid in full.5
Most commentators who understand the Bankruptcy Act's
confirmation standards have not questioned the premises of sec-
tion 1111(b) and treat the provision as a reasonable effort, if some-
times technically awkward or flawed,' to correct the Pine Gate
problem.7 This Article explores that problem and section 1111(b)'s
effect on it within the larger scheme of bankruptcy law.
Part II of this Article describes other bankruptcy rules that
must be understood before analyzing section 1111(b)'s operation.
Part III examines the Pine Gate decision and attempts to define
the problem that it created and that led to Congress' enactment of
section 1111(b). Analysis suggests that the Pine Gate problem does
not differ from many other valuation problems that arise in bank-
ruptcy. Accordingly, this problem is no more in need than they are
of extraordinary remedial measures such as section 1111(b). Tak-
ing the analysis one step further, part IV discusses the Pine Gate
problem's relation to the nature of security and the objectives of
bankruptcy policy. Although section 1111(b) reflects a view of se-
curity in bankruptcy based on a secured creditor's in rem rights to
collateral under state law, this approach is only one view of the
nature of security in bankruptcy. An alternative approach regards
state law security rules as a ranking mechanism, with secured cred-
itors ranked ahead of unsecured creditors, but does not necessarily
5. See U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1972) (personal property). When the debtor believes the col-
lateral is worth more than the amount of the debt owed to the secured creditor, the secured
party's authority to retain rather than sell the collateral is limited. See id. § 9-505. In the
case of real property, states may require a foreclosing creditor to go through a foreclosure
sale in which third parties may bid on the property.
6. See, e.g., Blum The "Fair and Equitable" Standard for Confirming Reorganiza-
tions Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 165 (1980); Kaplan, Nonre-
course Undersecured Creditors Under New Chapter 11-The Section 1111(b) Election: Al-
ready a Need for a Change, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269 (1979).
7. See, e.g., J. TROST, G. TREISTER, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, THE NEW FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY CODE 309-11 (1979); Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 301 (1982); Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram
Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979); Pachulski, The
Cram Down and Valuation Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REv. 925
(1980); Pusateri, Swartz & Shaiken, Section 1111(b) of the Bankruptcy Code: How Much
Does the Debtor Have to Pay and When Should the Creditor Elect?, 58 AM. BANIE. L.J. 129
(1984); Stein, Section 1111(b): Providing Undersecured Creditors with Postconfirmation
Appreciation in the Value of the Collateral, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195 (1982). But cf. Miller,
Bankruptcy Code Cramdown Under Chapter 11: New Threat to Shareholder Interests, 62
B.U.L. REv. 1059 (1982).
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honor state rules allowing repossession of collateral. This alterna-
tive view is, of necessity, the more dominant in bankruptcy. To the
extent section 1111(b) departs from the priority approach, the pro-
vision is inconsistent with the main thrust of bankruptcy law's
treatment of secured creditors.
Finally, part V points out specific inadequacies of section
1111(b)'s solution to the Pine Gate problem. Even assuming that
section 1111(b) addresses a problem demanding remedial mea-
sures, the statute fails to address the problem in an acceptable
manner. Section 1111(b) treats the Pine Gate problem as if the
matter can be resolved either in favor of the debtor or in favor of
the debtor's undersecured, nonrecourse creditors. Section 1111(b)
favors the undersecured creditors but simultaneously generates
residual effects on other creditors. Although the section 1111(b)
election was aimed at debtor behavior, other creditors often will
bear the cost.
II. WHAT SECTION 1111(B) DOES
A. Bankruptcy Law Background
To understand how section 1111(b) suspends basic bankruptcy
rules, one must grasp the Bankruptcy Act's treatment of under-
secured creditors and its mechanism for confirming a reorganiza-
tion plan. A creditor is undersecured when the value of its collat-
eral is less than the amount of the debt that the collateral secures.
In describing an undersecured creditor's status in bankruptcy, sec-
tion 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Act states in part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property. . . and is an un-
secured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest . . . is
less than the amount of such allowed claim.,
An undersecured creditor therefore has two claims in a bankruptcy
proceeding. The first is a secured claim, entitled to priority over
unsecured claims and equal to the value of the collateral. The sec-
ond claim, for an amount equal to the difference between the total
8. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982). The scope of § 506(a) depends upon the meaning of the
term "lien" in bankruptcy. Section 101(31) defines "lien" to mean "charge against or inter-
est in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." The term
therefore is broad enough to include security interests arising under Article 9 of the UCC,
real estate mortgages, judicial liens, statutory liens, and common-law liens. See id.
§ 101(30), (42), (43), (45) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
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claim and the secured claim, is an unsecured claim that shares on a
pro rata basis with other unsecured creditors. This difference usu-
ally is called the deficiency. To illustrate, if a secured creditor is
owed $100 and has an interest in $75 worth of the debtor's prop-
erty, the creditor has a secured claim of $75 and an unsecured
claim of $25.
Section 1111(b) modifies this dual treatment in reorganization
proceedings." Through its effect on confirmation standards, section
1111(b) alters a debtor's ability to confirm a reorganization plan
over creditors' objections. To understand how this modification op-
erates, one must understand the requirements for confirming a re-
organization plan over the objection of a class.10
Before a plan may be confirmed, each class of claims must ap-
prove the reorganization plan, not be impaired by the plan, or be
treated fairly and equitably by the plan.11 The interesting cases,
those of concern here, deal with an impaired class12 that has voted
to reject the plan.13 Confirmation of the plan thus depends on sat-
isfying the "fair and equitable" requirement of section 1129(b). 1"
Because a secured creditor often is the only creditor of its class, a
single creditor may prevent the class from approving a plan.
For secured claims, the statutory description of the fair and
9. Section 1111(b) applies only to cases brought under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Act. See id. § 103(f) (1982). For a discussion of the issues and problems that attend limiting
a provision's application to Chapter 11, see Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitle-
ments, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982).
10. Chapter 11's confirmation provisions operate both on classes of claims and on indi-
vidual claim holders. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (8) (1982 & Supp. 1984). Determining the
permissible classifications of claims and interests in a Chapter 11 plan is no simple matter.
See In re Medical Equities, Inc., 39 Bankr. 795, 798-804 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); In re S &
W Enter., 37 Bankr. 153, 157-65 (Bankr. N.D. IM. 1984); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1123(a)(1) (1982
& Supp. 1984); cf. In re Bradley, 705 F.2d 1409, 1411 (5th Cir. 1983); Barnes v. Whelan, 689
F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re Sanders, 13 Bankr. 320 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1984) (classification of claims in Chapter 13 cases). See generally
Epstein, Chapter 13: Its Operation, Its Statutory Requirements as to Payment to and
Classification of Unsecured Claims, and Its Advantages, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (1980) (dis-
cussing operation of Chapter 13 and comparative advantages over Chapters 7 and 11);
Vihon, Classification of Unsecured Claims: Squaring a Circle?, 55 Am. BANK& L.J. 143
(1981) (examining parameters of permissible § 1322 classifications).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8), (b)(1) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
12. In general, a reorganization plan does not impair a class if the plan does not alter
the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which the members of the class are entitled, id.
§ 1124(1), or if the plan alters such rights in a manner permitted by § 1124(2) or (3).
13. Section 1126 sets out the standards governing when a class will be deemed to have
approved a reorganization plan.
14. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1982). Section 1129(b)(2) contains a list of require-
ments included in the fair and equitable treatment standard.
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equitable requirement suggests that each claim holder receive "de-
ferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the
value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such prop-
erty."15 The present value of the income stream promised to the
secured creditor must equal at least the value of the creditor's in-
terest in collateral. For unsecured claims, the fair and equitable
test requires that each claim holder "receive or retain on account
of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the
plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim."' 6 The present
value of the income stream promised to the unsecured creditor
must equal the amount of the claim. If the reorganization plan
provides for payment of less than this amount, then no junior
claimant may receive or retain value under the plan.17 Because
both of these tests are class oriented, a class may waive them and
bind class members who dissent. This result cannot occur, how-
ever, when a secured class has only one member. 8
15. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II)(1982 & Supp. 1984). This branch of the fair and equita-
ble standard also requires that the secured claimant retain its Hen on the collateral. Id.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I). The other principal statutorily endorsed way to satisfy the fair and
equitable requirement allows the debtor to furnish the claimant with the "indubitable
equivalent" of its claim. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1982). For discussions of the equivalency
standard, see D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 526-32
(1984) and T. EISENBERG, DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW 514-17, 530-31 (1984).
The Bankruptcy Act does not define the phrase "fair and equitable." It merely provides
what one must presume to be a nonexclusive list of plan provisions that satisfy the fair and
equitable requirement. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1982). The fair and equitable test
worked differently prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) (holding that when plan of reorganization is not fair and
equitable, it cannot be confirmed even though the percentage of classes of security holders
required for confirmation have consented); Klee, supra note 7 (discussing additional re-
quirements under the new Bankruptcy Act).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i) (1982).
17. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
18. An individual claim holder within an impaired class receives protection in addition
to the protection afforded its class. The plan must provide a dissenting claim holder an
amount with a present value not less than the amount the holder would have received in a
Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii). This standard, often called the "best interests
of creditors" test, e.g., In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983), protects
dissenting class members.
In addition, when the § 1111(b)(2) election is made, a dissenting secured creditor must
"receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim property of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, that is not less than the value of such holder's interest" in the
collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1984). In other words, the plan must
promise an undersecured creditor making a § 1111(b)(2) election a stream of payments with
a present value equal to the value of the claimant's interest in the collateral. The additional
protection of the best interests test will matter only when an individual undersecured credi-
tor in a larger class objects to the class's approval of a plan.
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By suspending two basic rules of debtor-creditor law, section
1111(b) makes it more difficult for debtors to confirm plans over
the objection of undersecured creditors or nonrecourse creditors
and enables undersecured creditors to retain an interest in prop-
erty in the hope that the property's value will appreciate. To de-
velop and illustrate these assertions, it is necessary to explore sec-
tion 1111(b) in detail.
B. The Undersecured Creditor's Election
Section 506(a) bifurcates an undersecured claim into two
claims, one secured and one unsecured.19 Section 1111(b)(2) pro-
vides that, "notwithstanding section 506(a)," an electing under-
secured creditor's "claim is a secured claim to the extent that such
claim is allowed."2 Section 1111(b)(2) thus permits an under-
secured creditor to waive its section 506(a) unsecured claim and to
be treated as fully secured. The undersecured creditor may treat
its claim as fully secured regardless of the value of its collateral,21
which, under section 506(a), normally would determine the amount
of its secured claim. A previously unsecured portion of a claim may
thus be deemed secure.
Deeming an undersecured creditor to be fully secured, how-
ever, does not increase the value of the collateral to the full
amount of the creditor's claim. If it did, the creditor's interest in
the collateral of increased value would then vindicate its newly
found fully secure status. Even Congress, however, lacks the power
to command that an asset's value increase from $75 to $100,22 and
the undersecured creditor who makes the section 1111(b)(2) elec-
tion still finds itself with only $75 worth of collateral. The election
operates in a more subtle manner.
Through section 1129's confirmation mechanism,23 the election
alters the debtor's ability to obtain confirmation of a reorganiza-
tion plan and allows an undersecured creditor to try to benefit
from postconfirmation appreciation of its collateral. For the credi-
tor with a $100 claim and $75 worth of collateral, comparing its
status without and with the election is instructive.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1982); see supra text accompanying note 8.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(2) (1982).
21. When the class's interest in collateral "is of inconsequential value," the class may
not make the election. Id. § 1111(b)(1)(B)(i).
22. Congress might, however, influence value through taxation or other regulatory
measures.
23. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
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Without the section 1111(b)(2) election, the creditor has a $75
secured claim and a $25 unsecured claim. Under section 1129's
confirmation standards, a reorganization plan must provide for
payments with a present value of at least $75 to a creditor class
with a $75 secured claim and provide that the class retain its liens
to secure repayment of such amounts. 4 Regarding the $25 un-
secured claim, the plan must provide for payments to a noncon-
senting creditor with a present value equal at least to what the
creditor would have received in a liquidation proceeding. Further-
more, if any junior interests (usually shareholders) participate in
the reorganization, the plan must include a promise to make pay-
ments to the unsecured claimant with a present value of at least
$25.
By making the section 1111(b)(2) election, the undersecured
creditor is deemed to have a secured claim of $100. A dissenting
secured creditor class is entitled to a stream of payments with a
present value equal to its interest in collateral and a total equal to
the allowed amount of its constructively fully secured claim. The
electing undersecured creditor therefore becomes entitled under
the plan to a stream of payments totaling $100 with a present
value of at least $75. The creditor is more difficult to cash out be-
cause the total payout requirement has increased by the amount of
the deficiency.
What is the net effect of the election? One may examine this
question from the separate viewpoints of the debtor and its credi-
tors. The increased total payout requirement often will not burden
the debtor's effort to repay. With or without the election, the reor-
ganization plan must provide for a stream of payments with a pre-
sent value equal to the value of the collateral. Satisfying this pre-
sent value component of the payout requirement often will result
in payments to the section 1111(b) creditor that equal or exceed
the total amount of the creditor's secured claim, as increased
through the section 1111(b)(2) election.
In some circumstances, however, the total payout requirement
may make confirmation more difficult. If a plan's terms cover only
a few years during which interest rates are not exorbitant and if
the section 1111(b) creditor is substantially undersecured, then the
total payment requirement may be an important factor in the reor-
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1982 & Supp. 1984). For a discussion of the
limit on the protection that this requirement affords, see infra notes 121-22 and accompany-
ing text.
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ganization proceeding. For example, consider an undersecured
creditor owed $1,000,000 with security worth $100,000. With a dis-
count rate of ten percent, the creditor's secured claim normally
would entitle it only to payments totaling $100,000 with a present
value of $100,000. The section 1111(b) election would entitle the
creditor to payments totaling $1,000,000 with a present value of at
least $100,000. Even if all payments are deferred for three years,
the creditor would receive payments with a present value well in
excess of the value of the collateral. 5 Nevertheless, many potential
section 1111(b) creditors will not substantially increase their cur-
rent payout by making the election.
From the creditor's perspective, section 1111(b) provides two
primary benefits. First, the power to elect gives the creditor an en-
hanced bargaining position in the reorganization negotiations.2 6
Second, the collateral subject to the now fully secured claim may
increase in value. Since the secured creditor retains its lien and, by
making the election, is deemed to have an increased secured claim,
the debtor's subsequent sale of the collateral, before repayment
under the plan is completed, will generate funds subject to the
electing creditor's lien exceeding the amount the secured creditor
would receive absent the election. 7 The creditor thus retains a
right to enjoy future appreciation in the collateral or to compen-
sate for an initially low appraisal.
What price does the electing creditor pay for its new status?
25. The present value of $1,000,000 to be paid three years in the future at 10% is
$751,000. One must defer payment of $1,000,000 at least 24 years before the present value of
the payments would be $100,000. Deferring all payments to a substantially undersecured
creditor for a period of time sufficient to assure that the creditor will receive payments with
a present value of no more than $100,000 may present problems. If the period of time is
sufficiently long, a court simply may refuse to require the creditor to wait so long for any
substantial payments. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1982) (plan must be feasible).
26. This tactical advantage will affect cases settled through informal creditor agree-
ments that never reach bankruptcy courts. Professor Gilmore has stated:
No doubt many more cases are settled by informal creditor's committees than ever
reach the bankruptcy courts. But the tactical situation of a secured creditor in such
negotiations is decisively affected by the status that his security interest will have if
other creditors (or the debtor himself) decide on the last resort of filing a bankruptcy
petition.
2 G. GILMoRE, SEcuRrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 45.2, at 1288 (1965).
27. This analysis assumes that the contract covering the collateral accelerates the debt
when the debtor sells the collateral and that the debtor sells the collateral before the elect-
ing undersecured creditor has received payments under the reorganization plan totaling the
allowed amount of the now fully secured claim. After payments equal to the allowed amount
of the claim have been made, the § 1111(b) creditor may no longer have a lien securing
repayment of its debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1982 & Supp. 1984); Pachulski,
supra note 7, at 948; infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
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Because section 1111(b) treats the electing creditor's claim as fully
secured, the creditor no longer has an unsecured claim. If there is
any value in being a member of an unsecured class-for example,
when a substantial dividend will accrue to that class-the electing
undersecured creditor loses that benefit.
28
C. Nonrecourse Debt as Recourse Debt
Understanding section 1111(b)'s second unusual provision re-
quires knowledge of the difference between recourse debt and non-
recourse debt. When a secured creditor agrees to look only to col-
lateral to satisfy a claim against a debtor, that claim is nonrecourse
because the creditor does not have recourse against the debtor's
general assets to seek repayment of the debt. The creditor may not
bring an action against the debtor for any deficiency remaining af-
ter realizing the value of the collateral. In other words, a nonre-
course creditor who is owed $100 and who has an interest in collat-
eral with only $75 has no recourse against the debtor for the $25
deficiency. A recourse secured creditor, on the other hand, may
look not only to its collateral but also to any other property of the
debtor against which a money judgment is enforceable.
Section 1111(b)(1)(A) suspends this basic rule of debtor-credi-
tor law: "A claim secured by a lien on property of the estate shall
be allowed or disallowed under section 502 of this title the same as
if holder of such claim had recourse against the debtor on account
of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse
28. One could generate a set of circumstances in which the electing creditor reacquires
the benefit of membership in the unsecured class. Assume that the electing undersecured
creditor has a debt of $100 secured by collateral worth $75. Assume also that a reorganiza-
tion plan is confirmed but that the reorganization effort fails soon after confirmation, before
any payments have been made, and before any change in the value of the collateral. If the
electing creditor is treated as having a secured claim of $100 as of the date of confirmation,
then that creditor's situation is similar to that of an actual secured creditor owed $100
whose collateral actually was worth $100 on the date of reorganization. What status would
the creditor have in the second bankruptcy if its collateral were worth $100 at the time of
confirmation but later depreciated to the collateral's actual value of $75? One possible result
is that the actual creditor would have a $75 secured claim and a $25 unsecured claim in the
second bankruptcy.
If Congress intended the § 1111(b) creditor to be treated as if the creditor actually
emerged from the initial reorganization with $100 of security, then at the time of the second
bankruptcy the electing creditor might also have a $75 secured claim and a $25 unsecured
claim. This combination of claims is the same combination that the creditor would have had
in the first bankruptcy without the § 1111(b) election. The creditor's deficiency claim, sup-
posedly waived by the § 1111(b) election, thus has reemerged in the second bankruptcy.
This analysis, admittedly tentative, clouds statements to the effect that an electing creditor
waives its deficiency claim.
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.... "29 The provision thus allows nonrecourse secured claims as if
they have recourse against the debtor. More particularly, the pro-
vision treats undersecured creditors holding nonrecourse claims as
if they have unsecured claims for the amount of the deficiency.30
Given section 1111(b)(1)(A), no form of debt may be worthy of the
name nonrecourse because the creditor's inability to enjoy a defi-
ciency claim in bankruptcy could be considered an essential char-
acteristic of nonrecourse debt.
III. WHY ENACT SECTION 1111(B)?: THE Pine Gate PROBLEM
The rules that section 1111(b) affects-section 506(a)'s limita-
tion of secured claims to the value of the collateral and the usual
treatment of nonrecourse claims-are well within the mainstream
of bankruptcy and debtor-creditor law. Changing these rules
should require a reasonably clear showing that the rules do not
work. The impetus for both parts of section 1111(b) clearly stems
from Pine Gate and similar cases, but against the background of
what has transpired in its name, Pine Gate is somewhat disap-
pointing. The case involved no massive fraud, contained no clear
judicial blunder, and presented no plainly erroneous results. Fur-
thermore, Pine Gate raised no problem significantly different from
other, commonly ignored bankruptcy law problems.
A. The Case 1
Pine Gate Associates, a limited partnership that owned and
operated an apartment project, filed a petition for a real property
arrangement under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
Secured creditors held a mortgage on the apartment project. The
promissory notes evidencing the underlying debts stated that the
debtor would not be liable on the notes beyond the value of the
property and improvements constituting the apartment project. In
other words, neither Pine Gate Associates nor any of the partners
was personally liable on the debts owed to the secured creditors;
the loan was nonrecourse. The secured creditors disapproved of
Pine Gate's plan of arrangement. Pine Gate, therefore, proposed
29. 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b)(1)(A) (1982).
30. Section 1111(b)(1)(A)(i) seems to suspend the conversion of nonrecourse debt to
recourse status when a creditor makes the § 1111(b)(2) election to treat an undersecured
claim as fully secured. On the question whether undersecured creditors who benefit from the
conversion of nonrecourse debt to recourse debt may also make the § 1111(b) election to
treat their undersecured claim as fully secured, see Kaplan, supra note 6.
31. The statement of this case is based on T. EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 834-35.
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an appraisal of the apartment project and payment to the creditors
of the appraised value so that the plan could be confirmed. The
secured creditors objected and insisted that Chapter XII required
either full payment of their debts or surrender of the mortgaged
property.
The court rejected the creditors' argument. "[I]f the creditor
in lieu of the return of the property receives cash in the appraised
value of that property, the creditor receives the 'value of the debt'
and the creditor is adequately protected . . . and the plan can be
confirmed without the consent of said creditor. 3 2 The court also
held that the nonrecourse secured creditors were not entitled to
vote on Pine Gate's plan of arrangement as unsecured creditors be-
cause they had limited their claims to the value of security.33
The Pine Gate decision thus enabled a debtor to cash out a
dissenting nonrecourse secured creditor by paying that creditor the
value of its security. According to some commentators Pine Gate
gave debtors too powerful a weapon. I
[H]ighly leveraged limited partnerships which were established as investment
vehicles were able to use the automatic stay34 against lien enforcement to
prevent mortgagees from foreclosing during the Chapter XII case and in
many cases successfully avoided the adverse tax consequences to the partners
which foreclosure might entail. In addition, the partnership upon confirma-
tion of its plan and the scaling down of its mortgage obligations was able to
derive the exclusive benefits of any appreciation in the real estate markets
which may not have been anticipated by the court at the time of the court's
valuation of the secured creditor's interest in the property.35
Applying the Pine Gate result to our numerical example, if the
debtor cashed out the secured creditor for the value of its collat-
eral, $75, the creditor would have no further interest in the prop-
erty and no further debt obligation from the debtor. If the debtor
then sold the property for $100 after confirmation of the plan, the
debtor would enjoy the postconfirmation appreciation, or the bene-
fit of a low appraisal.
Section 1111(b) strives mightily to avoid the Pine Gate result.
Generally, that result may be avoided in three ways: First, if the
debtor is required to turn over the collateral to the secured credi-
tor; second, if the creditor may retain an interest in the property in
32. 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1478, 1484 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1976).
33. Id. at 1487.
34. Under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Act, the filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers an
automatic stay against acts to enforce liens. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982). Pine Gate was decided
at a time when old Bankruptcy Rule 12-43 imposed the automatic stay.
35. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1111.02, at 1111-18 (L. King 15th ed. 1981).
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the debtor's hands; and last, if the creditor may block confirmation
of the plan by voting the deficiency as an unsecured claim. Section
1111(b) invokes the second and third approaches. It makes nonre-
course debt into recourse debt and thus creates a deficiency claim
for the undersecured creditor to vote against the plan. Further-
more, section 1111(b) allows the undersecured creditor to elect to
treat its claim as fully secured, to retain its lien, and to wait for the
property to appreciate.
B. The Problem
Several commentators discuss the secured creditor's optimal
strategy under section 1111(b) and criticize that provision as
poorly drafted and in need of amendment. 6 To date, however, no
one has written to question the underlying premises of section
1111(b). I understand these premises to be: (1) that Pine Gate
presented a problem or set of problems requiring solution and (2)
that section 1111(b) constitutes a reasonable effort to furnish that
solution. Both premises are questionable.
Analysis of Pine Gate and section 1111(b) can proceed on two
levels. The first level raises questions about the bankruptcy ap-
praisal process and corresponds to the specific catalysts that begat
section 1111(b): Pine Gate itself, concerns about erroneous valua-
tions, and the problem of allocating appreciation between debtor
and creditor. The second level focuses less on matters of valuation
and more on the nature of secured credit. Pine Gate and section
1111(b) stand for different views of the nature of secured credit
and, in choosing between Pine Gate and section 1111(b), one
should recognize this more fundamental dichotomy. The valuation
aspects of Pine Gate and section 1111(b) are less interesting than
the nature-of-security aspects, but because valuation matters dom-
inate thinking about Pine Gate, this Article deals with them first
and then discusses in part IV the more interesting questions about
the Pine Gate problem's relationship to the nature of security.
1. Pine Gate as a Valuation Problem
Did Pine Gate create a problem that commanded complex leg-
islative solution through the Bankruptcy Act? The Pine Gate cred-
itors' principal complaint was that they were cashed out at one
price even though the collateral could be worth more than that
36. See supra notes 6-7.
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price. This objection raised a plain and simple valuation problem:
either the timing of the valuation was unfortunate, because it oc-
curred shortly before substantial unanticipated appreciation in the
value of the collateral or the valuation was incorrect. Neither of
these possibilities, however, suggests the existence of a new prob-
lem that commands solution.
Both the timing and accuracy of valuations are factors that
the law, particularly bankruptcy law, must live with.37 The entire
bankruptcy process depends on accepting valuations that often are
little more than educated guesses. The secured creditor's rights,
from adequate protection against the automatic stay, to the
amount of a secured claim, to rights on confirmation, depend on
valuation of the collateral in which the secured creditor claims an
interest.38 These valuations occasionally require appraising an en-
tire business as a going concern as well as a liquidated entity.39
Furthermore, the Bankruptcy Act's confirmation standards require
discounting to present value the payments that creditors will re-
ceive in the future.40 None of these matters is determinable with
methods approaching perfection.
The prevalence of valuation questions in bankruptcy is neither
good nor bad. Unless and until someone creates a satisfactory mar-
ket-based mechanism for valuing a failing enterprise, valuation
problems necessarily will continue. Once one accepts the premise
underlying formal reorganization law-that parties through private
negotiation cannot always agree how to apportion interests in a
failing enterprise-establishing mechanisms for valuing the enter-
prise and valuing the parties' interests in that enterprise becomes
necessary.
Building in "second-looks" or other mechanisms designed to
overcome poorly timed or erroneous valuations would hamper the
bankruptcy process. 41 For the most part Congress has refused to
37. For suggestions that reliance on market valuations could replace bankruptcy court
valuations, see Roe, A New Model for Corporate Reorganizations, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
530 (1983) (recommending stock sale to ascertain value of the firm). But see 1 L.J. BON-
BRIGHT. THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY 233-66 (1937)(questioning use of stock market prices
as a valuation mechanism).
38. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362, 506(b), 1129(b) (1982).
39. See id. § 1129(a)(7), (a)(8), (b).
40. Id. § 1129(a)(7), (b). For some of the varied methods used to discount to present
value, see, e.g., In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1275 (1984).
41. Striving for improvements in the valuation process generally, however, might not
hamper the bankruptcy process.
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authorize such procedures except through the normal mechanism
of appeal. The Pine Gate problem raises no special concerns that
require departure from this longstanding principle, yet Congress
has made that departure in section 1111(b).
The principle of protecting creditors from erroneous valua-
tions, however, has implications that Congress did not explore
when it enacted section 1111(b). First, a Congress concerned about
valuations should consider providing checking mechanisms for the
many other valuation issues that arise in bankruptcy. Justification
for section 1111(b) requires, at a minimum, some explanation why
this valuation question differs from other bankruptcy valuation
questions. No one addressed this and related matters in developing
section 1111(b). Everyone approached the Pine Gate problem as if
it were an abstract issue independent of an old-fashioned valuation
problem.42
Second, if undersecured creditors are to enjoy protection
against the risk of low appraisals, should not bankruptcy law pre-
vent them from enjoying the benefit of high appraisals? In our il-
lustration, suppose the undersecured creditor were cashed out for
$75 and the debtor later could sell the property for only $50.
Should the secured party be required to return the excess $25?
Before Congress enacted section 1111(b), such a requirement could
evoke little support. True, the secured party enjoyed the benefit of
an erroneous or fortuitously timed appraisal, but in other cases the
secured party will suffer from too low an appraisal. Section 1111(b)
may reduce such a long-run balancing effect.
Third, a secured party cashed out in a reorganization must sell
its interest under extraordinary circumstances. In many areas of
debtor-creditor law, debtors routinely suffer the burdens of under-
valuation and inadequate prices fetched at forced sales. State law
efforts to protect against these results is strong evidence of their
existence.4 Debtors or their unsecured creditors probably lose a
42. See, e.g., supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text; infra notes 43-60 and accom-
panying text. Section 502(c), which requires estimation of the value of contingent, unliqui-
dated claims, may present particularly vexing valuation problems.
43. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507 (1972) (personal property); CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc.
§§ 701.540 - .640, .660 - .680 (1980) (real property). The routineness of inadequate prices in
forced sales is emerging in an important series of bankruptcy cases. See Baird & Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. RE V. 829 (1985) (article in
this Symposium). Compare In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir.) (sale price at foreclosure
cannot automatically be assumed to provide reasonable equivalent of debtor's interest), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980) (consideration received at nonjudicial foreclosure sale found not to be."fair considera-
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good deal more than secured creditors from erroneous valuations
and coerced sales of interests. The emergence of bankruptcy pro-
tection only for undersecured creditors is troubling.44
2. Pine Gate as a Timing Problem
Pine Gate raised another aspect of the valuation problem.
Since the creditors feared that the collateral might be valued more
highly after the time of appraisal, part of the difficulty may have
rested on the valuation's timing.45 From this perspective, whether
or not the collateral received a faulty valuation, the secured credi-
tors suffered from valuation at an erroneous or unfortunate time.
Yet here as well justifying special treatment for this timing prob-
lem is difficult.
The timing of an appraisal, like the amount of an appraisal, is
an issue that regularly arises in bankruptcy. Values determined
during a bankruptcy proceeding might be fixed as of the date of
the petition, the date of proposal of a reorganization plan, the date
of plan confirmation, or some other time. In some important areas
of bankruptcy law, Congress has refused to prescribe the time for
valuation of property or a debtor's interest, even when the valua-
tion must occur during the bankruptcy proceeding.46
A bankruptcy proceeding may require valuing a business or
property before commencement of the proceeding. A preference
challenge to a prebankruptcy transfer may require valuations as of
a year before the filing of a bankruptcy petition.47 A fraudulent
conveyance challenge to a prebankruptcy transfer may require
reaching back even further in time.48 Although no one believes that
tion" or "fair equivalent" under Bankruptcy Act) with In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.
1984) (transfer occurred at time trust deed was perfected and, therefore, beyond the period
during which transfers are vulnerable under § 548).
44. Creditors may stand in a better position to protect themselves. If creditors per-
ceive that they are suffering from low valuations, they can raise interest rates. If erroneous
valuations cause harm, they cause harm to all parties by reducing the benefits of security
and by creating artificial incentives to force or resist the bankruptcy forum.
45. An accurate appraisal would, of course, reflect the possibility of a future increase
or decrease in value.
46. Section 1129's confirmation standards, for example, which often depend on ascer-
taining the liquidation and "going concern" values of a business, do not specify when the
valuation determinations must occur. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (b) (1982); HR. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1977) ("section [361] does not specify. . . when [value] is to
be determined"). But see 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2) (1982) (for exemption purposes, value
"means fair market value as of the date of the filing of the petition").
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3), (4) (1982).
48. A fraudulent conveyance proceeding may be brought under § 548(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act to recover transfers made within one year of the date of the filing of the bank-
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these values are determinable with scientific precision, Congress
has fashioned no mechanism comparable to section 1111(b) to ad-
dress difficulties arising from timing questions.
If one remains convinced that Pine Gate presents a special
timing problem, another bankruptcy provision may suggest a more
promising approach. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Act addresses
timing problems in the makeup of the bankruptcy estate.49 For
reasons that sometimes are not entirely clear, bankruptcy law long
has been concerned with the debtor who inherits property shortly
after declaring bankruptcy. Perhaps the fear is that the debtor or
persons affiliated with the debtor may have the power to manipu-
late the date of receipt. The scheming debtor may try to maneuver
the receipt of property to a time after the filing of a bankruptcy
petition so that the property does not become part of the estate
available for distribution to creditors. ° In Pine Gate situations as
well creditors may fear that the debtor could influence the timing
of an already questionable cash-out valuation so that subsequent
appreciation in the value of the collateral is not includable in the
valuation.51
An approach similar to the one employed in section 541(a)(5)
in inheritance and similar situations might address the timing con-
cerns. Section 541(a)(5) provides for a 180-day period after the fil-
ing of the bankruptcy petition during which inheritances or simi-
larly treated property become part of the estate.5 2 A similar look-
back provision could be useful in the Pine Gate situation to as-
suage fears about the timing of a cash-out valuation. If a debtor
sells property for substantially more than the valuation amount
within a fixed period of time after the valuation, perhaps the
ruptey petition. Id. § 548(a) (Supp. 1984). If the fraudulent conveyances also are vulnerable
under state law, the trustee may rely on § 544(b) of the Bankruptcy Act to seek recovery.
See id. § 544(b) (1982). Actions brought under § 544(b) are not subject to § 548(a)'s one
year limitation. Section 550(e), however, does require that an action against a transferee of a
fraudulent conveyance be brought within one year after the avoidance of the transfer. See
id. § 550(e) (Supp. 1984).
49. See id. § 541 (1982).
50. Perhaps a better view of the lookback provisions is that the payments to which
they apply sometimes constitute windfalls. A debtor who has recently filed for bankruptcy
should be required to share such windfalls with creditors who have not been fully paid. Not
all of the payments that § 541(a)(5) covers may be viewed easily as windfalls, however.
Marital property settlements, to which § 541(a)(5) has applied since the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, id. § 541(a)(5)(B), usually are not considered windfalls.
51. For a suggestion that opportunities for debtor manipulation may remain despite
the enactment of § 1111(b)(2), see infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. See also Roe,
supra note 37, at 577-78 (noting possible manipulation of market valuations).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5) (Supp. 1984).
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debtor should be required to turn over the excess amount to the
trustee for the benefit of creditors who did not receive full pay-
ment.5 3 The more elaborate section 1111(b) solution, which has
substantial side effects, 54 is not needed.
3. The Risk of Systematic Undervaluations
Concerns about the accuracy and timing of valuations are
common in reorganization law. Standing alone, these concerns can-
not justify the unusual, complicating provisions in section 1111(b).
Section 1111(b) may make most sense if viewed as addressing not
only the risk of erroneous valuations but also the risk of systematic
undervaluation of secured creditors' interests.5 This theory might
help to explain the special treatment of the risk of erroneous valu-
ation and why the treatment tilts toward offering undersecured
creditors additional leverage in the reorganization process. Al-
though one might expect erroneous valuations to have long-run ef-
fects that cancel out, systematic undervaluations, by definition, are
not so benign.
Do courts systematically undervalue secured creditors' inter-
ests in collateral? One can imagine an argument why courts might
do so. A reorganization court dealing with a financially distressed
debtor might err, even subconsciously, on the side of undervaluing
collateral. Undervaluing collateral enables the debtor to use the
collateral at a lower cost and, therefore, enhances the chances for
successful reorganization. Erroneous overvaluation of collateral
may increase a debtor's costs to the point of endangering the reor-
ganization. Thus, a bankruptcy court with an inclination towards a
reorganization might naturally err on the side of undervaluing
collateral.
Viewed in this light, section 1111(b), which tempers the effects
of undervaluation of collateral, begins to look like a rare effort to
account for the realities of reorganization. Section 1111(b) sus-
pends the usual implicit statutory assumptions of a world in which
valuation issues are evenly and smoothly resolved and considers
the behavior of the flesh and blood participants in a
reorganization.
But no one has made a persuasive case for the systematic un-
53. See Fitzgerald v. Davis, 729 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1984) (requiring reassessment of
fair market value when sale price exceeded original estimate).
54. See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
55. Even in that perspective one would have to ask whether the problem § 1111(b)
addresses requires a more general solution.
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dervaluation assumption. Neither the data gathered before the
1978 Bankruptcy Act nor what one might predict without hard
data would support section 1111(b). The hearings accompanying
the 1978 Bankruptcy Act provided a forum in which the assump-
tion could be tested and debated, yet those hearings did not in-
clude evidence of a systematic undervaluation phenomenon. 6 Even
some evidence to the contrary was available. In the area of prefer-
ences, the 1978 Bankruptcy Act made important changes in a valu-
ation-related issue because Congress viewed results of preference
litigation as too unfavorable to trustees litigating for the estate.5
Bankruptcy courts hell-bent on fostering reorganizations would not
be expected frequently to resolve such issues against trustees. The
final text of section 1111(b) developed so late in the legislative pro-
cess, with so little public discussion and consideration, that any
correlation between that provision and the real world problems re-
flected in the hearings would have been fortuitous. 8 It is as if
someone happened to catch the ear of a sympathetic member of
Congress late in the legislative process and achieved insertion of a
pet provision.
Furthermore, given the presence of other valuation issues in
bankruptcy, systematic undervaluation of collateral is a questiona-
ble mechanism for bankruptcy courts to employ in support of an
unconscious inclination toward debtors. Systematic undervaluation
in another context may hinder, rather than assist, the debtor. For
example, when a secured party moves for adequate protection
against the effect of section 362's59 automatic stay, placing an arti-
56. For references to the Pine Gate problem, see Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 703-04, 709-10, 720-21, 857-58, 871-75 (1977). Cf. Roe, supra
note 37, at 547-48 (courts may overvalue enterprise out of sympathy for junior interests).
57. Section 547 of the new Bankruptcy Act eliminates the previous requirement that
the trustee prove that the recipient of a preference have reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent. The requirement was viewed as making a trustee's ability to recover
preferences too difficult. See National Bankruptcy Conference, Report of the Comm. on
Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial Code (1970), HR:. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seass. 204, 209 (1977). Many of the gains made on behalf of trustees
by elimination of the reasonable-cause-to-believe requirement may have been lost through
the 1984 amendments. These amendments except from preference treatment payments
made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs without regard to the 45 day
limitation contained in the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 462(c), 98 Stat. 333 (amending 11 U.S.C. §
547(c)(2) (1982)).
58. The legislative history of § 1111(b) is traced in CoLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 35, 1111-11 to -15. See Coogan, supra note 7, at 341.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
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ficially low value on collateral may contravene the debtor's inter-
est. A low value for purposes of a request for relief from the auto-
matic stay means that the secured creditor has either no equity
cushion or a diminished equity cushion and, therefore, may be en-
titled to greater protection through cash payments, 0 an entitle-
ment that will not assist a debtor struggling to reorganize. One sus-
pects that the immediate prospect of a secured creditor's
reclamation of collateral to compensate for lack of adequate pro-
tection threatens more reorganizations than does the later problem
of confirmation standards. The valuation phenomenon in bank-
ruptcy is too complex to support the simple assumptions that sec-
tion 1111(b) implicitly embodies.
IV. Pine Gate AND THE NATURE OF SECURITY
Upon initial examination, section 1111(b) responds either to
commonplace questions about the accuracy and timing of valua-
tions or to an implicit assertion, unsupported by hard data and of
questionable theoretical accuracy, about systematic valuation bi-
ases of bankruptcy judges. There is, however, yet another, perhaps
deeper, way of looking at section 1111(b) and the Pine Gate
problem.
A. Two Views of Security
The Pine Gate secured creditors arguably received less than
their 'due if, under state security law, they obtained rights in the
property constituting the collateral for their loans. A security in-
terest, the argument might run, consists of more than the right to
be bought out at an appraised value. That interest also gives the
secured creditor in rem rights in the collateral until the loan is re-
paid in full, without forcing the secured creditor to bear the bur-
den of others' guesses about the value of the collateral.61
60. A creditor seeking relief from the automatic stay is entitled to adequate protection
of its interest in collateral. See id. § 362(d). Section 361 describes adequate protection. Fur-
thermore, several courts have taken into account the size of an equity cushion in determin-
ing the scope of the necessary protection. See, e.g., In re Mellor, 734 F.2d 1396, 1400-01 (9th
Cir. 1984); In re Curtis, 9 Bankr. 110, 111-13 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); see also D. BAIRD & T.
JACKSON,, supra note 15, at 532 (noting that secured party's incentive at adequate protection
stage may be to undervalue collateral; later in proceeding incentive may be to overvalue
collateral); T. EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 530.
61. U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to -507 (1972). For an analysis that deemphasizes the secured
creditor's state law in rem rights, see Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 97, 112-13 (1984).
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The Pine Gate secured creditors claimed in rem rights in the
collateral by arguing that they should receive the property itself
and that Pine Gate Associates could not cash out their interest in
the property at an appraised value. Under this approach, on de-
fault the creditors would have become entitled to repayment in full
or to the property itself-the basic state law rights of a secured
creditor with an acceleration clause in its debt instrument.6 2 The
Pine Gate creditors claimed an in rem interest in the security that
was independent of any valuation process.63 On default, if the
property was not worth more than the debt, the debtor could sat-
isfy the secured creditors' interest only by allowing the creditors to
retake the property or by redeeming the property through pay-
ment of the full amount of the debt. The debtor could not satisfy
this in rem interest merely by paying the creditors the value of the
collateral.
Section 1111(b) thus may be viewed as providing an under-
secured creditor a way to vindicate its state law in rem interest
without requiring physical surrender of the property to the credi-
tor. By making the election, the creditor retains a greater interest
in the collateral than if the creditor were cashed out. The in rem
right is not gutted but honored in a way that allows the reorganiza-
tion to continue by permitting the debtor to retain possession of
the collateral.64
If this were the only acceptable view of the secured creditor's
rights in bankruptcy, then section 1111(b)(2) would rest on its
most solid footing.6 5 An alternative, scaled-down view of the nature
of a secured creditor's rights in bankruptcy, however, does not re-
gard the secured creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding as retaining
62. But see supra note 5 (discussing limits on secured creditors' rights).
63. A valuation limitation on their interest would arise upon any plausible assertion
that the collateral was worth more than the full amount of the debt. In that case, the debtor
would be entitled to any surplus.
64. The kinship between rights created by § 1111(b) and state law in rem rights may
provide the most natural explanation for the provision's existence, but ultimately this justi-
fication fails. Whether the provision works is open to question, see infra notes 121-23 and
accompanying text, as is the provision's theoretical connection to the underlying in rem
right. As Professor Jackson has noted, one can view furnishing the creditor with rights in a
bankruptcy proceeding as a means to honor and substitute for the actual nonbankruptcy
rights that the creditor must compromise to satisfy the needs of the bankruptcy proceeding.
See Jackson, Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 73 (1985). If the § 1111(b) rights are in fact substitutes for state law rights, it is
unclear how fiddling with matters of valuation respects the underlying in rem rights.
65. Constructing a rational explanation for the part of § 1111(b) that converts nonre-
course debt to recourse debt is more difficult.
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its state law in rem interest in collateral. This view translates se-
cured status into a priority claim equal to the value of the credi-
tor's collateral, which alone is the measure of the value of the cred-
itor's secured status in bankruptcy.
Under the priority approach, secured creditors have merely a
right to be paid ahead of other creditors to the extent of the value
of the secured creditors' collateral. They have no right to force sur-
render of specific property. This security-as-priority view limits
the Pine Gate secured creditors' complaints to questions about
technique and timing of valuation. Pine Gate honored the secured
creditors' priority by paying them ahead of general unsecured
creditors.
The in rem and security-as-priority views may not be the only
plausible ways to think about security interests. But these con-
cepts do capture widely shared notions about security. Many se-
cured creditors tend to think of themselves as having a tangible,
physical interest in collateral. Some believe their rights violated
when the collateral turns out not to be "theirs." This in rem view
runs sufficiently deep to generate constitutional overtones to the
treatment of secured credit, 6 and the Supreme Court has given lip
service to a sharp distinction between the constitutional rights of
secured and unsecured creditors.6 With respect to the priority
view, many secured creditors are less concerned about ownership
of particular collateral than with ranking ahead of competing
claimants.6 8
Which view of security-in rem interest in property or a rank-
ing mechanism-should prevail in bankruptcy? Without pretend-
ing that they are the only possible bases for discussion, I mention
two criteria that influence analysis of this question: (1) consistency
of approach with other bankruptcy provisions, and (2) desirability
in light of bankruptcy policy. One can analyze the first factor more
easily because consistency analysis requires merely noting the as-
sumptions implicit in secured creditors' treatment under other
bankruptcy provisions. The second factor raises basic questions
about the rationales for reorganizations and for the decision to
honor secured credit.69
66. See infra note 69.
67. See id.
68. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 61.
69. One doubts that the Constitution requires more favorable treatment of secured
creditors than they received in Pine Gate. First, Congress probably is free to change pro-
spectively the status of security in bankruptcy, perhaps even to the point of eliminating its
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B. The Dominance of the Security-as-Priority View in
Bankruptcy
Pine Gate presents one of many situations in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in which the security-as-priority view prevails over in rem
interests that state law may confer. Most bankruptcy provisions
affecting secured creditors rest on the premise that such creditors
may be cashed out for the value of their collateral. In the context
of a bankruptcy proceeding, section 1111(b) is unusual in its effort
to preserve the secured creditor's right either to receive full pay-
ment or to retain an interest in the property.
Bankruptcy law goes to some lengths to assure that state re-
possession rules do not thwart prospects for a successful, or at least
orderly, reorganization. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
section 362 imposes an automatic stay-a form of injunction-on
priority. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935); In re
Groves, 707 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1983); In re Webber, 674 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1086 (1982); 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1982), sustained in In re Ashe, 712 F.2d 864 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1279 (1984); D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 15, at
610-12; Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study
of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARv.
L. REV. 973, 1005-12 (1983). But see Rogers, supra, at 977 n.14, 981 n.34. The more difficult
issues concerning bankruptcy's inroads on state law security rights have arisen in the con-
text of efforts to apply new bankruptcy provisions to pre-existing liens. See id. at 1013-30;
see also United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 495 U.S. 70 (1982).
Even for bankruptcy provisions enacted after attachment of a lien, it is unlikely that
the Pine Gate treatment went too far. Language in a leading case, Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), calls into question any bankruptcy mechanism
that does not allow a secured creditor on default either to realize the liquidation value of the
collateral through sale or to retain the property until the debt is paid in full. See id. at 580-
83. The troublesome aspects of the Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934) (held
void in Radford) considered in Radford, however, did a good deal more than require a se-
cured creditor to accept cash payments of the collateral's appraised value in lieu of the
secured interest. Under the Frazier-Lemke Act, a dissenting secured creditor could lose both
the right to repossess security immediately and the right to receive its value. A creditor
could be limited to receiving the annual rental value of the property for a period of five
years. The Act did not require payment of the appraised price of the property during the
five-year period. Radford, 295 U.S. at 575-76. This limitation constituted a more drastic
inroad on security than any encroachment in Pine Gate.
Furthermore, after Radford the Supreme Court sustained bankruptcy provisions, in-
cluding one strikingly similar to the one invalidated in Radford, that impaired secured cred-
itors' interests more severely than Pine Gate did. In Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Moun-
tain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937), the Court sustained a version of the Frazier-Lemke
Act that authorized the debtor to wait three years before paying the appraised value of the
secured party's collateral. In Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935), the Court sustained provisions substantially delaying secured cred-
itors' right of enforcement. For further discussion of the tension between Radford and later
cases, see Rogers, supra, at 979-85.
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actions by creditors against the debtor and against collateral.70
This stay interferes with a secured creditor's right to possession.
Even if a secured claimant succeeds in repossessing collateral
before bankruptcy, section 542 may require that the creditor re-
turn the property to the bankruptcy trustee.7' Section 363 autho-
rizes the trustee to use, sell, or lease collateral to which the secured
party would be entitled under state law.72 Debtors in both Chapter
11 and Chapter 13 proceedings may "deaccelerate" mortgage loans
that the lender has accelerated under state law prior to
bankruptcy.7a
In some reorganizations the trustee must furnish a secured
party "adequate protection" for its state law interest in collateral.
Although the Bankruptcy Act does not define the exact contours of
the concept,74 adequate protection never requires more than cur-
rent payment to the creditor of the full appraised value of its in-
terest in the collateral.7 5 Even In re Murel Holding Corp.,76 the
case usually relied on as giving the firmest protection to secured
creditors' interests, would have allowed appraisal and payment of
the value of the secured creditor's lien.77 Yet this is precisely what
the Pine Gate court offered the undersecured creditors. If Pine
Gate's implicit view of security-as-priority created a problem wor-
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
71. See id. § 542(a); cf. United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (In-
ternal Revenue Service must return assets seized prior to bankruptcy to satisfy tax lien).
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1982).
73. See id. §§ 1124(2), 1322(b)(5); see also Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n,
730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982). But cf. In re Seidel,
752 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985) (no deacceleration on debt maturing prior to bankruptcy).
74. For a case discussing the various approaches to the adequate protection concept,
see In re American Mariner Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Baird &
Jackson, supra note 61; Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bar-
gain Models of Fairness, 68 MiNN. L. REv. 1 (1983).
75. Courts and commentators may not agree, however, over the method of measuring
the full appraised value during the period when the debtor retains possession of the prop-
erty. See supra note 74.
76. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). In Murel, Judge Learned Hand found that a stay
against a foreclosure action should not be granted where the debtor had proposed a reorgan-
ization plan insufficiently protective of a mortgagee's rights. The mortgagee maintained only
a small equity cushion, and the plan proposed no amortization for a period of 10 years.
77. See id. at 942. In light of Murel's murky holding (the case tells us only that a
rather weak plan was insufficient) and procedural posture (the court ruled on a request for
relief from a stay, though Judge Hand clearly had his eye on the feasibility of the proposed
plan, see supra note 76), Congress, courts, and commentators may have placed too much
reliance on Murel in deriving standards of adequate protection in other contexts. The argu-
ment that the adequacy of protection at the confirmation stage, when the secured creditor is
locked into a plan, should be firmer than at some preliminary stage, such as when relief is
sought from § 362(a)'s automatic stay, merits consideration.
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thy of solution, then one must rethink much of the rest of the
Bankruptcy Act's treatment of secured creditors' state law posses-
sory rights.78
C. Section 1111(b), Pine Gate, and Bankruptcy Policy
Assessing section 1111(b) as a matter of bankruptcy policy re-
quires discussion of three related matters. First, one must identify
a justification for the decision to honor secured credit outside of
bankruptcy. Unless we understand why secured credit is desirable
in the nonbankruptcy setting, where secured credit originates,
evaluating the wisdom of modifying secured creditors' rights in
bankruptcy is difficult. Second, assessing section 1111(b) requires
some sense of why Congress provides for bankruptcy reorganiza-
tions, where the election operates. Reasonable persons may differ
about the wisdom of reorganization laws.7 9 Third, having identified
reasons for secured credit and reorganizations, one must resolve
the tension between nonbankruptcy law's need to honor secured
credit and reorganization law's need to modify it. In many cases, a
reorganization requires diluting one creditor's interests in the hope
of securing benefits for other creditors. Section 1111(b) and Pine
Gate present one facet of this larger problem.
The analysis below reaches the predictable conclusion that the
policy bases for secured credit and bankruptcy reorganizations
support contrasting views of security. This section then suggests
possible approaches to reconcile this conflict. Debate over section
1111(b), however, probably is not the ideal forum in which to ad-
dress this matter.
1. The Bases for Secured Credit and Reorganizations
There are in the literature several useful discussions of why
secured credit exists.80 Discussion here is limited to two of the
78. Section 722 would be particularly vulnerable since it allows a Chapter 7 debtor to
redeem collateral by paying its value to the secured creditor. This procedure bears a striking
similarity to what the court did in Pine Gate. For a discussion of the limits on this right of
redemption, see In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983).
79. Some Western countries do not even have reorganization laws. England, for exam-
ple, has no reorganization mechanism corresponding to Chapter 11. For a discussion of the
treatment of security interests under French bankruptcy law, see Haimo, A Practical Guide
to Secured Transactions in France, 58 TuL. L. REv. 1164, 1193-97 (1984).
80. See, e.g., Chan & Kantas, Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in
Loan Agreements, 17 J. MoNEY, CREDrr & BANKINo 84 (1985); Jackson & Kronman, Secured
Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Schwartz, Security
Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
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leading rationales: (1) secured credit's ability to cater to various
levels of risk aversion among lenders and the different costs of se-
curity among debtors,81 and (2) secured credit's ability to exploit
the relative advantages some creditors enjoy in monitoring debtor
behavior.8 2 Under the differing risk aversion view, those who want
to make riskier, unsecured loans may do so and those who want
more protection through security may obtain that protection. Bor-
rowers as well obtain a wider range of credit choices through the
availability of secured credit. Under the differing monitoring costs
view, the benefits of secured credit accrue from allowing those with
a relative cost advantage in monitoring a debtor's behavior to ex-
ploit that advantage and pass on the lower costs.
If risk aversion, differences in demand for secured credit
among debtors, and differences in creditors' monitoring costs con-
stitute the strongest rationales for secured credit, then Pine Gate
and the security-as-priority view have a real cost. The Pine Gate
rule will drive some of the most strongly risk averse lenders from
the market because the rule does not honor their views of how and
when to dispose of collateral.8 3 Consequently, some debtors who
have a stronger relative preference for secured credit will be unable
to obtain it. Under Pine Gate, the benefits accruing to creditors
from the ability to exploit lower monitoring costs also will dimin-
ish. Superior monitoring provides less assistance when a bank-
ruptcy proceeding may remove some of the property being moni-
tored from the creditor's grasp. Section 1111(b) cushions these
effects.
The dominant justification for reorganizations is to preserve a
going concern value that would be lost through piecemeal liquida-
tion. 4 The precise lines of reasoning underlying the justification
(1981); White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV.
473 (1984).
81. The risk aversion hypothesis has generated the most controversy among commen-
tators. See supra note 80. Professor Schwartz recently has taken the debate one step further
by suggesting justifications for secured credit that are supersets of the risk aversion hypoth-
esis. See Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1068
(1984) (suggesting that we need to ask why some lenders or debtors want secured credit
more than others). To the extent that the. discussion herein depends on a precise justifica-
tion for secured credit, the discussion must be regarded as tentative.
82. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 80, at 1158-61.
83. If secured credit does rest on honoring the different risk preferences of creditors,
then it may not be satisfactory to substitute a package of rights to future value for the
secured creditor's right to immediate repossession. Contra Baird & Jackson, supra note 61.
84. See, e.g., J. TRosT, G. TREisTER, L. FORMAN, Y. KLEE & R. LEVIN, supra note 7;
Baird & Jackson, supra note 61, at 117.
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may differ. Some may believe that creditors would bargain for a
reorganization system in advance to maximize the return to credi-
tors as a group."5 Under this view, only the presence of multiple
actors prevents the automatic preservation of going concern value
that would be achieved if a firm had a single owner and no credi-
tors."6 Others think it unfair that secured creditors, whose priority
interest is honored, should also be able to prevent preservation of
going concern value.
If one accepts this value maintenance justification for reorga-
nizations, many bankruptcy reorganizations must temper state law
rules that allow repossession by secured parties who are not fully
repaid. Debtors in reorganization usually cannot pay significant
creditors in full. If the collateral is important to achieving the reor-
ganization goal of maximizing value, then honoring a state law re-
possession rule may frustrate the bankruptcy proceeding's purpose.
More importantly, one cannot predict in advance whether honor-
ing an in rem interest will prevent a reorganization from preserving
an entity's going concern value. Bankruptcy judges need discretion
to resolve these matters on a case-by-case basis.8 7
2. The Traditional Bases for Reconciliation
The leading arguments for secured credit support an in rem
view of security,88 and the leading rationale for Chapter 11 reorga-
nizations supports Pine Gate and the priority view. These underly-
ing rationales, as developed to date, are therefore unlikely to lead
to a clear basis for choosing between the Pine Gate approach and
that of section 1111(b). In the end, one must analyze the relation-
ship between nonbankruptcy security law and reorganization the-
ory. The principles that govern their relationship may be used to
choose between the two views of security.
Bankruptcy law should not tinker unnecessarily with state law
rights.89 The bundle of state law rights presumptively worthy of
85. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 9.
86. Id.
87. The need to modify state law in rem interests does not, standing alone, make a
case against § 1111(b) because § 1111(b) allows modification of those interests. The need to
modify state law interests, however, suggests that the Pine Gate creditors' in rem view of
security cannot be the sole guide to sound bankruptcy treatment.
88. Arguments favoring secured credit also would support the priority view. The point
is that a secured creditor plausibly may claim to attach importance to rights represented by
both the in rem and priority views.
89. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 61; Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective,
28 UCLA L. Rav. 953, 959-76 (1981); Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L.
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respect includes in rem rights in collateral. The right to be free
from judicial reexamination of a lender's assessments of a collat-
eral's value and the right to optimal timing and manner of sale can
be important. These rights often provide incentives to keep a
debtor out of bankruptcy or to push a debtor into bankruptcy.90
Some financing sellers, particularly small sellers without large loan
portfolios, simply might refuse to sell property unless assured of
full payment or return of the specific property sold."1 Unnecessary
modification of these state law rights would create perverse incen-
tives for some creditors and debtors to opt for bankruptcy merely
to avoid the effects of the state rule.
If state security law is an appropriate starting point for articu-
lating secured creditors' rights in bankruptcy, then more work is
necessary before one can reconcile the Bankruptcy Act's effect on
secured creditors with stated justifications for reorganizations.
Most efforts to justify reorganizations rely principally on the ra-
tionale that reorganizations try to preserve the excess of going con-
cern value over liquidation value, or on some other statement of a
value maximizing principle. Proponents do not take the further
necessary step of supporting the specific inroads made on secured
creditors' rights in the reorganization's quest for additional value.
These rationales do not explain, for example, why secured credi-
tors receive no compensation for the extra risks that their coerced
participation in a reorganization imposes.9 2 Rationales based on
value maximization do not explain how to allocate the risks inher-
ent in achieving the maximized value.
The creditors' bargain model assumes that creditors, secured
and unsecured, will find it advantageous to agree upon a collective
proceeding in which to deal with financially troubled debtors. It is
not clear, however, that secured creditors would or should agree in
advance to the treatment of secured credit in the current bank-
ruptcy system. Although secured creditors might find the idea of a
REv. 725 (1984); Jackson, supra note 9, at 883-87.
90. But see Baird & Jackson, supra note 61, at 112-14.
91. For a factual situation in which this might have been the case, see In re Hobson
Pike, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1205 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1977) (farmers who sold farmland and
retained mortgage may have thought they could recover property if debtor did not fulfill
purchase obligation). But see supra note 5 (noting limits on creditors' ability to foreclose
under state law).
92. Professors Baird and Jackson have argued that to avoid this problem of insuffi-
cient compensation, adequate protection under § 362 should be fully compensatory and
should include compensation for extra risks. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 61.
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collective proceeding attractive, 3 on closer examination they would
find that the current collective proceeding imposes distinctly unat-
tractive burdens on them. Bankruptcy provisions such as the auto-
matic stay and the trustee's power to use or sell collateral impose
costs and risks on secured creditors without giving them any payoff
other than allowing them to recover what they would have recov-
ered under state law in the absence of a bankruptcy proceeding.
Indeed, the benefits of the bankruptcy provisions affecting secured
creditors usually rest with unsecured creditors. For secured credi-
tors, bankruptcy imposes risks without corresponding rewards.9 4
Another justification for reorganizations asserts the unfairness
of allowing highly ranked secured creditors to hinder an effective
reorganization. This rationale also fails to explain why secured
creditors should bear the risk of reorganization without receiving
any compensation for taking the risk. The best that secured credi-
tors can hope for is the prebankruptcy status quo, in which they
would have received the value of their collateral. In our system the
existence of a potential benefit to others from compromising a
party's entitlement generally is not, stahding alone, a sufficient jus-
tification for the compromise.
Surprisingly few commentators discuss this deeper problem
93. See Jackson, supra note 9. Professor Jackson's model seems premised on the as-
sumption that the details of secured creditors' treatment will be designed to insulate them
from harm in the reorganization proceeding. See id. at 868-71; see also Baird & Jackson,
supra note 61.
94. Shifting bankruptcy risks to junior interests, as Professors Baird & Jackson have
proposed, see Baird & Jackson, supra note 61, may not be satisfactory from the viewpoint of
a creditors' bargain model. Secured creditors need some positive incentive to agree to a
collective proceeding when they would otherwise rank first. Furthermore, if one justifies
secured credit on the basis of the differing risk aversion among lenders, then recasting their
bargains may go to the very heart of the basis for secured credit. The administrative diffi-
culty of calculating the incentives for a secured party may be a reason for not compensating
the secured party for this added risk.
It is also unclear whether unsecured creditors would agree in advance to our current
system of honoring secured credit in bankruptcy and honoring other techniques, such as use
of state spendthrift trusts, see 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2)(1982), letters of credit, see Baird,
Standby Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy, 49 U. CHL L. REv. 130 (1982), and escrows, see
Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963), that effectively allow avoiding
participation in what is usually described as a collective proceeding. The Bankruptcy Act
does contain countermeasures that deal with other efforts to avoid entanglements with
bankrupts. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362; 365(b), (c), (e), (f); 542; 543 (1982). The net effect of this
odd collection of avoidance and anti-avoidance rules is that risk aversion may be honored in
some instances and not honored in others. Perhaps the bottom line is that "those creditors
with sophisticated planning ability, and with the expertise and funds to set up escrows and
letters of credit, [and secured transactions], will avoid entanglement in bankruptcy, and less
sophisticated creditors, particularly small trade creditors, will routinely be entangled in
bankruptcy proceedings." T. EISENBERG, supra note 15, at 549.
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involving reorganization theory and secured credit-that one can-
not terminate analysis merely because a set of rules seeks to maxi-
mize value. Perhaps the issue has been obscured because much of
the focus on the treatment of secured creditors centers on constitu-
tional matters.9 If a question about a provision's constitutionality
is raised and dismissed, some may assume that the provision is
sound on all grounds. Perhaps the issue has been obscured because
the principle of maximizing overall values, without focusing on
who pays the cost, is so seductive. Or perhaps it is because the
rhetoric of bankruptcy law assures that secured creditors will re-
ceive adequate protection or the "indubitable equivalent" of their
interest,96 a promise that sounds as though the secured creditors
have nothing to worry about, however different reality might be.9 7
3. A New Basis for Reconciliation
Are there new lines of reasoning to support bankruptcy law's
inroads upon secured credit? One possible approach rests on ques-
tioning the traditional barrier between secured and unsecured
credit. In this perspective, one could change the analytical starting
point from asking whether bankruptcy law should differ from state
law in treating secured credit to asking whether bankruptcy law
should be more solicitous of secured creditors' rights than of un-
secured creditors' rights.
Bankruptcy law often disregards important aspects of state
law treatment of creditors' status. Bankruptcy law's treatment of
secured credit deviates from this general approach. For example,
bankruptcy will not necessarily preserve whatever state law con-
tractual advantages an unsecured creditor may enjoy as the result
of financial covenants in a loan agreement. A state law judgment
creditor who has not levied may have a significant advantage under
state law over other creditors merely by being closer to being able
to levy. The creditor, however, will find that advantage eliminated
in bankruptcy. Similarly, under state law a creditor may enjoy an
advantage over competitors by having delivered a writ of execution
to the sheriff, or by having less knowledge of competing claims. In
general, bankruptcy law has a levelling effect on subtle differences
in creditors' positions that state law, if allowed to run its course
95. See supra note 69.
96. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361(3), 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1982).
97. One of the few discussions that recognizes the deeper problem resolves the issue by
arguing that the essence of the secured creditors' bargain rests in the priority achieved and
not in any in rem interest obtained. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 61.
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uninterrupted by a bankruptcy proceeding, would respect. 8 By
classifying claims as secured or unsecured, bankruptcy law requires
all-or-nothing treatment of rights that state law would address as
if on a continuum.
One might question, therefore, whether secured credit is suffi-
ciently different in kind from other credit to justify sheltering se-
cured credit from bankruptcy's levelling effect. Grants of security
are, after all, merely additional terms in a contract. An unsecured
lender has inchoate rights in a debtor's nonexempt property. Al-
though these rights usually depend on obtaining and enforcing a
judgment, they also include other property-specific attributes, such
as the ability to bring fraudulent conveyance and bulk transfer
challenges against certain transfers. Through financial covenants
and other contractual terms, some unsecured lenders have en-
hanced inchoate claims to a debtor's property.
Security agreements, though they theoretically confer rights in
specific property, are merely another version of enhanced rights.
The secured creditor's idealized status often is tarnished by reality.
A secured party must observe limitations on breaches of the peace,
limitations on the time and place of sale, and limitations on the
amount of value that may be realized from collateral. State laws
imposing significant restrictions on secured creditors' rights to re-
alize upon their collateral highlight the continuity between secured
and unsecured forms of debt.99 Furthermore, secured creditors'
rights are subordinate to those of a large class of claim-
ants-buyers in the ordinary course of business 00-and secured
creditors have uncertain rights as against some lien creditors.101
These factors suggest that the difference between secured and
unsecured forms of debt is more one of degree than of kind. If this
is true, then the pertinent question is not whether bankruptcy law
should depart from state law treatment of security, but whether
bankruptcy law should depart from state law treatment of un-
secured credit without also doing so for secured credit.
One cannot respond to this argument simply by asserting the
98. For a normative defense of the levelling effect, see Jackson, supra note 89, at 732-
35.
99. See supra note 5.
100. See U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1972).
101. See, e.g., Frisch, The Priority Secured Party/Subordinate Lien Creditor Conflict:
Is "Lien-Two" Out in the Cold?, 33 BUFF. L. REV. 149 (1984); Justice, Secured Parties and
Judgment Creditors-The Courts and Section 9-311 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 30
Bus. LAw. 433 (1975).
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need to preserve the efficiencies or other benefits of secured credit.
Financial covenants and other terms of unsecured credit agree-
ments cater to the same concerns and needs as secured credit does.
Unsecured credit terms cater to variations in risk aversion, to dif-
ferences in monitoring costs, and to other factors that support the
nonbankruptcy existence of secured credit. Even though unsecured
debt contract provisions may promote efficiency or reduce moni-
toring costs, bankruptcy generally disregards them and discharges
the underlying debt, cutting off unsecured lenders' inchoate inter-
ests in a debtor's property.
Why are these efficiencies not worth preserving while those at-
tending secured credit are worth saving? One answer may be that
the costs of preserving in bankruptcy the relative nonbankruptcy
advantages of unsecured creditors would be high. The near infinite
gradations of unsecured creditor status under state law may be ig-
nored if honoring them in bankruptcy would require resolution of
many priority contests that would not have arisen under state law
because creditors probably would have achieved clearer state law
status before actual disputes arose. This kind of concession to real-
ity, however, if applied to secured creditors, further clouds the dis-
tinction between secured and unsecured debt. The problems of lo-
cating, identifying, repossessing, and realizing the value of
collateral are not trivial. The greater these practical obstacles, the
more a secured party begins to look like an unsecured party.
In short, the line between secured and unsecured creditor sta-
tus is less clear than it first appears. Justifying separate treatment
for one bundle of property rights likely presents no simpler a task
here than in determining what constitutes a taking under the fifth
amendment. 10 2 Bankruptcy law's inroads upon secured credit,
through Pine Gate and statutory provisions, may be viewed as
cushioning the drastically different treatment bankruptcy gener-
ally accords secured and unsecured credit.
Even if secured credit differs sufficiently from unsecured
credit to warrant separate treatment in bankruptcy, administrative
concerns may justify not compensating the secured party for all of
the additional burdens that attend prohibiting foreclosure in ac-
102. See, e.g., Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967). One might take
the analogy to the takings problem even further. An in rem view of security emphasizes the
physcial "taking" of a secured creditor's interest, and the physical taking has long been one
of the central factors in constitutional taking doctrine. The priority view, on the other hand,
deemphasizes the physical aspect of the issue.
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cordance with state law. Providing a crude measure of protection
under the label "adequate protection" may be more efficient than
calculating and valuing the added risk imposed on a secured party.
The general goal of bankruptcy law would be to leave the secured
party unaffected by the bankruptcy proceeding. 0 3
Finally, the existence of federal reorganization law effectively
limits the states' authority to enact reorganization measures. 04
How would states deal with secured credit absent federal reorgani-
zation law? If federal law did not already undertake the difficult
task of modifying secured creditors' rights, states might have to
rethink their entire secured credit structure. Perhaps one should
view current federal bankruptcy law as striking the balance state
law would strike if state law could encompass reorganizations.
From that perspective, the entitlements at stake under state law
might not be those we are used to considering.10 5
4. Section 1111(b) as a Minor Detail
However promising these and other avenues of analysis might
be-and none of them necessarily would lead to the specific collec-
tion of bankruptcy rules that now affect secured
credit-assessment of section 1111(b) probably need not reach
such depth. If one were rethinking such basic matters as the scope
of the automatic stay, the standards of adequate protection, or the
standards governing cram down, a return to first principles might
be unavoidable. With respect to the costs imposed by Pine Gate
and the wisdom of a marginal provision such as section 1111(b),
the ultimate wisdom of honoring state law rights cannot be as-
sessed in a vacuum. As described above, bankruptcy law affects se-
cured creditors' interests in many ways unrelated to section
1111(b) and Pine Gate.0 Other bankruptcy inroads upon security
already will have driven from the market those marginal secured
lenders worried about Pine Gate. Given what is already done to
secured creditors' in rem rights in the name of fostering effective
reorganizations, the question whether Pine Gate's further altera-
tion of state law rights represents sound bankruptcy policy has a
103. See Jackson, supra note 9, at 870 n.62.
104. See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929); T. EISENBFRG, supra
note 15, at 435.
105. It is difficult, however, to see why state control over reorganizations should make
a drastic difference. The problem would then be how to coordinate a state's regular debtor-
creditor with its reorganization law.
106. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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hollow ring. If all of the other measures affecting secured creditors
may be justified in the name of whatever policies reorganization
law serves, Pine Gate cannot be the only bankruptcy inroad on
state law rights that crosses the line between sound and unsound
policy.
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE SECTION 1111(B) SOLUTION
Pine Gate presents either one aspect of the general valuation
problem in debtor-creditor law or a problem concerning the nature
of security. In either case, the result in Pine Gate is at least as
faithful to the needs, dominant goals, and general approach of our
bankruptcy law as is section 1111(b). Even assuming that the valu-
ation problem rationally may be confined to situations that section
1111(b) covers, 1 7 the solution that Congress chose is flawed. In en-
acting section 1111(b), Congress focused solely on how that section
would affect debtors and undersecured creditors, neglecting the
provision's effects on other creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding.
In addition, Congress did not adequately tailor section 1111(b) to
the problem that generated it. If the case for section 1111(b) rests
on doubts about the valuation process, then it is reasonable to
limit the provision's scope to cases in which doubts about valua-
tion are a central concern. Section 1111(b) is not so limited.
A. Effects on Other Creditors
Viewed as a valuation matter, Pine Gate presents a problem
between a debtor and its creditors. Those troubled by Pine Gate
were most upset because a creditor did not receive full repayment
even though the debtor might later enjoy the benefit of the value
of collateral that could have been used to pay the creditor. In ana-
lyzing any response to Pine Gate that is not limited to remedying
this perceived core anomaly, one must weigh the benefit of its con-
tribution towards resolution of the Pine Gate problem against its
side effects in other areas. Section 1111(b) seems to have more side
effects than core effects.
Rather than draft a solution tailored to the Pine Gate situa-
tion, a single-asset reorganization involving nonrecourse debt,10 8
107. Perhaps data would support our systematic undervaluation analysis, see supra
notes 55-60 and accompanying text, and dispel concerns about departing from bankruptcy's
normal view of security as priority.
108. Reported cases to date suggest that undersecured creditors have employed the
§ 1111(b) election in factual settings that differ from that in Pine Gate; its reported use has
not been limited to single-asset reorganizations. See In re Polytherm Indus., Inc, 33 Bankr.
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Congress through section 1111(b) enacted a solution that funda-
mentally changes the way confirmation standards function in
bankruptcy reorganizations. Section 1111(b) is not limited to cases
in which a low valuation may redound to the debtor's benefit. The
provision grants the undersecured creditor and the nonrecourse
creditor additional leverage against all participants in a
reorganization.
The claim that the section 1111(b) election provides under-
secured creditors additional leverage requires discussion. The un-
dersecured creditor should make the election only in limited cir-
cumstances 09  because the election in effect waives the
undersecured creditor's normal unsecured claim for a deficiency.
Unless a creditor expects the collateral to increase in value and the
debtor to sell it, the election seems to require the undersecured
creditor to sacrifice its undersecured claim for little in return.
How does the section 1111(b) election enhance the under-
secured creditor's position vis-a-vis other creditors? One approach
to this question requires stepping into the shoes of another credi-
tor at the time of the negotiations over interests in the reorganiz-
ing entity. At the time creditors are sorting out interests no one
knows whether the debtor's business will succeed or fail, or
whether particular assets will increase or decrease in value. Each
creditor must formulate its position in part on implicit or explicit
assessments of the probabilities of success of the enterprise and of
increases in the value of assets, as well as the probabilities of fail-
ure of the enterprise and of decreases in the value of assets. In the
absence of the section 1111(b) election, other creditors could in-
clude in their calculus the probability of a postcashout increase in
value of assets formerly subject to the undersecured creditor's in-
terest. If a creditor makes the section 1111(b) election, assets that
might have become available to other creditors will be unavailable
because an increase in the assets' value is subject to the electing
undersecured creditor's lien.
823 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); In re White, 36 Bankr. 199 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re
Southern Mo. Towing Serv., Inc., 35 Bankr. 313 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983); In re Hallum, 29
Bankr. 343 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In re Griffiths, 27 Bankr. 873 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983).
But see In re Greenland Vistas, Inc., 33 Bankr. 366 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (single-asset
case); In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1980) (same). Fur-
thermore, the unreported effects of the § 1111(b) election are likely to be much more impor-
tant. The existence of § 1111(b) influences starting points and bargaining positions in the
negotiations that must accompany any reorganization with a chance of success. See supra
notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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This advance absorption of one source of value in a reorga-
nized entity will affect the other creditor's positions in the reorga-
nized entity. At the time of negotiation, other creditors' risks are
greater than they would be without the section 1111(b) election
because their inability to benefit from increases in the value of the
undersecured creditor's collateral reduces the present expected
value of the interests available to them. In any reorganization in
which a single undersecured creditor is not the only creditor, the
effort to prevent the debtor from enjoying increases in the value of
collateral has the residual, previously unnoticed effect of rearrang-
ing the status and bargaining position of the undersecured creditor
vis-a-vis all other creditors.1 0
Considering a failed reorganization may illustrate more con-
cretely section 1111(b)'s effects on other creditors. Assume that our
undersecured creditor with a debt of $100 and collateral of $75
elects to be treated as fully secured because the creditor expects
the collateral to appreciate in value. The creditor finds itself with a
secured claim of $100, secured by a lien "to the extent of the al-
lowed amount of such" claim. 1 ' The lien thus secured repayment
of $100. Assume further that the debtor's reorganization plan is
confirmed but that the reorganization effort fails soon after confir-
mation, before any payments have been made, and after the collat-
eral has appreciated in value to $100.
Without the section 1111(b) election, the creditor could have
been cashed out for $75 at the time of confirmation and unsecured
creditors would have received the $25 in subsequent appreciation.
With the section 1111(b) election, the electing creditor has a lien
securing repayment of $100. It has captured for its benefit the $25
in appreciation that would have gone to unsecured creditors and
not to the debtor.112
Section 1111(b)(1)(A)'s treatment of nonrecourse debt as re-
course debt has a more obvious effect on creditors' bargaining posi-
tions. That provision may allow undersecured creditors, such as
those in Pine Gate, to block confirmation of a debtor's reorganiza-
110. In theory, those creditors able to do so will adjust their interest rates and lending
practices to reflect § 1111(b)'s existence. Even with such adjustments, however, one would
then have to justify the added complexity and uncertainty generated by § 1111(b).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)(A)(i)(I) (1982).
112. Although this illustration demonstrates that the § 1111(b) election often occurs at
the expense of other creditors, it does so in a factual setting that presents the election in a
relatively favorable light. Here the undersecured creditor expects the collateral to increase
in value and, if allowed the benefit of its state law bargain, the creditor would have repos-
sessed the collateral and waited for the increase to occur before selling the collateral.
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tion plan. Conferring recourse status on a nonrecourse creditor cre-
ates an unsecured claim that may prevent confirmation of the reor-
ganization plan. A creditor in such a class must then be cashed out
through compliance with section 1129(b)'s fair and equitable
standard.
But the nonrecourse-to-recourse solution works comfortably
only in a situation in which no other creditors are in the picture. In
a single creditor situation, preventing confirmation of a plan when
the undersecured creditor believes its collateral has been underval-
ued may avoid a flow of value from the undersecured creditor to
the debtor.113 When other creditors are involved in the reorganiza-
tion, the provision enhances the nonrecourse creditor's status at
the expense of other creditors. In multiple creditor situations,
therefore, the nonrecourse creditor and not the debtor benefits
from the value freed by the nonrecourse aspect of the under-
secured creditor's claim. Converting the undersecured creditor's
claim to recourse status merely creates another claimant for the
limited debt and equity interests in a reorganized entity.
This result is not theoretically appealing. Nonrecourse credi-
tors are not strong candidates for special protection. The creditor
who lends on a nonrecourse basis does so with knowledge of the
consequences; most small or consumer creditors would not even
know how to do so. Furthermore, the nonrecourse creditor's bar-
gain includes an agreement to look solely to collateral for repay-
ment. Fidelity to the state law bargain, which seemed to be the
driving force behind the undersecured creditor's election under
section 1111(b)(2), disappears as a consideration when recasting
nonrecourse debt as recourse debt. By recasting that bargain, sec-
tion 1111(b) alters state law-there is now no pure nonrecourse
debt-without any clear benefit to the bankruptcy process.
B. Cases in Which Undervaluation is Not a Prime Concern
1. Reasonably Certain Valuations
Whatever one thinks of the valuation biases of bankruptcy
judges, there are cases in which arriving at an accurate valuation is
not difficult. Consider nonrecourse debt secured by a pledge of
publicly traded securities. If the securities decline in value so that
113. For a pre-§ 1111(b) situation in which the Pine Gate rule was applied when there
were no other creditors, see In re Hobson Pike, 3 BANK&n CT. DEc. (CRR) 1205 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1977).
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the creditor becomes undersecured, there is little reason to give the
creditor an unsecured claim for the deficiency in bankruptcy or an
opportunity to elect to be treated as fully secured. If the creditor
believes the stock will increase in value, it may use the payments
promised under the reorganization plan, which must equal the pre-
sent value of the security, to purchase the stock on the open mar-
ket.114 In any case in which the valuation process is reasonably cer-
tain, section 1111(b) makes little sense.
2. The Substantially Undersecured Creditor
Examples illustrating section 1111(b)'s application usually
present a "nice" relationship between the amount of the debt and
the value of the security."15 In these illustrations the creditor is
undersecured, but the creditor is not drastically undersecured. Sec-
tion 1111(b)'s authorization to treat the partially secured creditor
as fully secured, even when the debt is nonrecourse, does not ap-
pear to be an extraordinary measure. Increasing the disparity be-
tween the amount of the debt and the value of the security, how-
ever, upsets this placid situation.
Consider the undersecured creditor with a nonrecourse claim
of $1,000,000 and security worth $100,000. Without section 1111(b)
the creditor would have a secured claim of $100,000 and no un-
secured claim. The unsecured creditors could approve the reorgani-
zation plan without this creditor's participation. If this under-
secured creditor were the only creditor in its class, a reorganization
plan could be confirmed over its objection by providing in the plan
for payments to that creditor with a present value of $100,000.
Moreover, the plan could be confirmed despite participation of
junior interests in the proceedings.
Section 1111(b)'s conversion of nonrecourse debt to recourse
debt changes this situation. The nonrecourse creditor now has an
unsecured claim of $900,000 and a secured claim of $100,000. Ap-
proval of the plan over such a creditor's objection would require
favorable votes by a substantial amount of other unsecured claims.
Absent such class approval, junior interests could not participate
114. The open market purchase may not provide the full equivalent of retaining an
interest in the pledged securities. Cashing out the secured creditor would generate tax con-
sequences and purchasing the stock in the open market would generate commission costs.
But transferring the pledged stock to the creditor in satisfaction of the debt would also
generate tax consequences and recovering pledged stock from a bankrupt entity may not be
cost-free.
115. See Blum, supra note 6; Klee, supra note 7; Pachulski, supra note 7.
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unless the plan provided for payment of the $900,000 claim in full.
Section 1111(b), therefore, can transform a creditor who was
merely a factor in the reorganization into the dominant factor, all
in the name of preventing the debtor from enjoying the benefit of
postvaluation appreciation of collateral.
3. Bargained-For Undersecurity and Nonconsensual Secured
Claims
Problems with section 1111(b) transcend the confirmation and
valuation processes. In some situations the provision makes almost
no sense. First, consider a creditor who is undersecured not be-
cause of a decrease in the value of collateral that initially fully se-
cured its loan. This creditor is instead undersecured either because
the creditor was willing to take a chance or because the debtor
drove a hard bargain and wanted to preserve some of the value of
the collateral for possible later borrowing. Presumably this creditor
is compensated for its greater risk through ability to charge a
higher rate of interest than if fully secured.
Why should this creditor ever be able to treat its loan as re-
course? Yet even if the parties agreed that equipment worth $75
will secure a loan of $100 (or perhaps the debtor has appraised the
property more shrewdly than the creditor), section 1111(b) applies.
In bankruptcy, the intentionally undersecured creditor finds itself
with the option of being treated as fully secured."'
Second, consider a creditor who has a secured claim in bank-
ruptcy arising from a transaction other than a grant of a consen-
sual security interest. If, prior to bankruptcy, a debtor loses a con-
tract action resulting in a $10,000 judgment, the judgment creditor,
if it does nothing more, has an unsecured claim in bankruptcy, and
section 1111(b) does not become relevant.
If, however, the judgment creditor takes the additional step of
having the sheriff levy on $5000 of the debtor's property, the credi-
tor has a lien on that property to secure payment of the judg-
ment.'" Under section 506(a), a $10,000 judgment creditor with a
lien on $5000 worth of property has a secured claim of $5000 and
116. Creditors may remain free to waive their § 1111(b) rights by contractual arrange-
ment with the debtor. In any event, negotiating such a provision would probably add to the
costs of credit transactions because creditors would not routinely include a provision limit-
ing their rights in standard loan documents. Debtors would have to ask for the waiver and
supply a quid pro quo.
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
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an unsecured claim of $5000.1" Since section 1111(b) is not limited
to consensual secured transactions, it applies to all secured claims,
this creditor becomes eligible to make the section 1111(b)(2) elec-
tion to have its claim treated as if fully secured.
This undersecured creditor has no basis, however, for asserting
reliance on in rem rights to sell the encumbered property. The
creditor had the sheriff seize any available assets, and state law
may require the sheriff to sell those assets. 1 9 It is difficult to imag-
ine a justification for section 1111(b) in this situation. More impor-
tantly, if the creditor manages to levy on any substantial amount
of assets, section 1111(b) enables the creditor to leverage that sta-
tus into treatment of its entire claim as secured. 120 It is doubtful
that Congress ever considered these consequences of section
1111(b).
C. Does Section 1111(b) Work?
By making the section 1111(b)(2) election, the undersecured
creditor obtains the protection that section 1129(b)(2)'s fair and
equitable standard affords for the creditor's full claim. The most
specific portion of the fair and equitable standard states in part
"that the holders of [secured] claims retain the lien securing such
claims ...to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims
. . . ., Under one interpretation of this language, the protection
that sections 1111(b)(2) and 1129 provide is limited to assuring the
undersecured creditor that it will receive payments equal to the
total amount of its secured claim, with a present value equal to the
value of the collateral. The lien that the creditor must retain pur-
suant to section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) secures only the right to this
combination of payment characteristics.
As section 1129 currently reads, therefore, retention of the lien
does not necessarily assure that the electing undersecured creditor
will in fact enjoy the benefit of subsequent appreciation in the col-
lateral. Section 1129 does not state that electing creditors retain
their liens to secure receipt of an amount having a value, as of the
date of confirmation of the reorganization plan, equal to the al-
lowed amount of the fully secured claims.
118. See id. § 506(a) (1982).
119. See, e.g., N.Y. CIV. PRAC. R. § 5233 (McKinney 1978).
120. Similarly, if state law provides a creditor with a valid statutory lien, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(45) (1982 & Supp. 1984), for any substantial part of the creditor's claim, § 1111(b)
treats the full amount of the creditor's claim as if the claim were secured.
121. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) (1982).
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If an undersecured creditor receives payments equaling the to-
tal amount of the enhanced secured claim, with a present value as
of the effective date of the plan equal to the value of the collateral,
then the section 1129(b) lien may not have an obligation left to
secure. At that point the undersecured creditor has no interest in
any appreciation in the collateral, or in the "true" value of the col-
lateral to the extent it exceeds the initial valuation. Extinguish-
ment of the lien after a stream of payments with the above charac-
teristics may occur even though the creditor has not received any
payments to reflect the difference between an erroneously low ini-
tial valuation of the collateral and a subsequent increase in value.
The creditor may be cashed out without receiving anything for the
higher value. A debtor, therefore, may achieve the economic
equivalent of cashing out the undersecured creditor on confirma-
tion by choosing an appropriate period of payments in light of the
governing discount rate. In short, a result not unlike that reached
in Pine Gate may remain possible through careful planning.122
An alternative view of section 1129(b)(2) may be more in
keeping with the goals of section 1111(b)(2)-that the section
1129(b)(2) lien must secure whatever the undersecured creditor is
entitled to receive under the reorganization plan. The lien would
remain in existence despite the creditor's receipt of payments with
a present value equal to the value of the collateral. The lien would
remain until the creditor received all payments that the plan re-
quired. Although this alternative view may follow more faithfully
the underlying rationale for section 1111(b), it is somewhat more
difficult to reconcile with the description of the lien in section
1129(b)(2),12s which reads in terms of the amount of the claim and
not in terms of the obligations to be performed under the plan.
122. To illustrate, assume that an undersecured creditor is owed $100 and has an in-
terest in collateral worth $90. The creditor believes that the valuation of the collateral is low
and, therefore, makes the § 1111(b)(2) election to avoid being cashed out for $90. The
debtor proposes a plan that provides for payment to the creditor of $100 one year from the
effective date of the plan. Assuming a discount rate of 10%, upon payment the creditor will
have received payments totaling $100 (the allowed amount of the secured claim) with a
value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least $90. Upon such payment there is no
underlying obligation left for the § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) lien to secure. The creditor has, in
effect, been cashed out for payment of $90 on the effective date of the plan, the very result
§ 1111(b)(2) was designed to avoid. This result is possible only when there is a suitable
relationship among the amount of the debt, the value of the collateral, and the discount
rate.
123. Of course, it remains possible for a court to supplement § 1129(b)(2)'s illustra-
tions of fair and equitable treatment.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In discussing an area as technical as confirmation of reorgani-
zation plans, it is tempting to leap to illustrations of the detailed
operations of the intricate provisions involved. Without such illus-
tration few will understand the statutory provisions, because the
provisions themselves are far from self-explanatory. Yet by the
time one has worked through a detailed example or two, there may
be little energy left to assess the less technical considerations un-
derlying a particular provision. Having mastered a provision's op-
eration, one may even have a vested interest in its survival.
Section 1111(b) and the related confirmation provisions con-
tained in section 1129 are particularly ripe candidates for technical
discussions that pretermit more fundamental inquiries. One is so
grateful to have grasped how the provisions work-on a first read-
ing it is difficult to believe that they mean what they say1 24-that
one fails to proceed to critical assessment of the provisions. The
provisions seem to have supplied writers with an irresistible im-
pulse to discuss technical aspects of confirmation.
Because of the narrowing effect that technical provisions have
on legal discussions, it is even more important for those who un-
derstand the technical provisions to discuss those provisions' role
in the larger statutory and legal framework. Under almost any
larger view not influenced by an overreaction to the result in Pine
Gate, section 1111(b) does not coexist comfortably with the general
goals of the reorganization process or with the general thrust of
bankruptcy law. At a minimum, section 1111(b)'s complicating fea-
tures are not worth their costs.
Section 1111(b), whatever its direct costs, may be most troub-
lesome as evidence of another problem in bankruptcy law. Viewed
in hindsight, with knowledge of the 1984 bankruptcy amend-
ments,' 5 section 1111(b) may be a precursor to the balkanization
of bankruptcy law. Enactment of that provision was a triumph for
one special interest group-nonrecourse real estate lenders-that
secured passage of a provision of little if any value to the bank-
ruptcy process as a whole. Other groups achieved similar success in
1978,126 and the process showed signs of getting out of hand in the
124. Professor White has termed § 1111(b)(2) "incomprehensible." J. WHITE, BANK-
RUPTCY AND CREDITOR'S RIGHTS 317 (1985).
125. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
126. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(b)(3) (special protection for shopping centers against as-
sumption of executory contracts), 1110 (special protection for security interest in aircraft
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1984 amendments. Bankruptcy law now provides special treatment
for, among others, holders of timeshare interests under timeshare
plans, 12 7 farmers who sell grain, 2 8 United States fishermen, 29 and
repurchase agreements.13 0
One hesitates to advocate the sort of know-nothing attitude
that automatically condemns without detailed analysis each new
complicating provision of the Bankruptcy Act. The basic needs of
the bankruptcy process, however, mandate few of these provisions.
One hopes that they serve some larger societal goals.
and vessels) (1982).
127. See id. §§ 101(47), 365(h) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
128. See id. §§ 546(d), 557.
129. See id. §§ 507(a)(5)(B), 546(d).
130. See id. §§ 101(39), 546(f), 559. The 1984 amendments also provide even more
special protection for shopping centers. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 362(a), 98 Stat. 333 (amending 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1982)).
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